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Human Fetal Tissue: Scientific Uses and
Ethical Concerns
CAROL A. TAUER, PH.D.

ABSTRACT- Human fetal tissue has been used in research for decades, but recent attempts to implant fetal
neural tissue as therapy for Parkinson's disease have stimulated discussion of ethical and policy issues. In late
1989 a moratorium on federal support of fetal tissue transplantation research was indefinitely extended, based
on the connection between this research and elective abortion. Four abortion-related objections to the use
of fetal tissue can be identified: 1. The procedures of abortion and tissue procurement are linked in practice;
2. One who uses fetal tissue is complicit with the abortions which provided the tissue; 3. The prospect of
therapeutic use of tissue could influence some women to choose abortion; 4. The therapeutic success of fetal
tissue transplants could lead to greater public acceptance of elective abortion. The moral significance of these
objections is currently being debated.

Introduction
During the past few years, both the public media and
scientific journals have reported a flurry of activity in the area
of fetal tissue research. When this research involves the use
of human fetal tissue, the issues are ethical and political as
well as scientific and medical. Most appropriately, the recent
interest in research involving human fetal tissue has been
accompanied by vigorous discussion of related ethical and
public policy questions.
The current high level of interest in the use of fetal tissue
could lead one to believe that this area of research is a fairly
new one. In particular, where human fetal tissue is involved,
one might think that Roe v. Wade, which legalized abortion
nationally in 1973, made this research possible. On the
contrary, human fetal tissue has been used for research
purposes for decades, and fetal tissue transplants for
therapeutic purposes were attempted as early as 1928 (in
Italy), and since the 1930s in the United States (1,2).
When elective abortion was illegal, researchers made use
of whatever tissue was available, whether from spontaneous
abortions or from abortions performed out of medical
necessity. The pregnant women whose fetuses provided this
tissue were probably unaware of the ways in which the tissue
was used. Most likely, the consent form for surgical abortion
simply included a sentence indicating that "tissue removed
may be examined and retained for medical or educational
purposes," as in other surgical consent forms. In case of
spontaneous abortion in a hospital, consent was probably
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assumed unless a woman specifically asked for information
on the disposition of fetal material. After the legalization of
abortion in the United States, consent forms customarily
continued to include a simple sentence noting that tissue
might be retained, examined, and utilized. Since this language
is so widely used in relation to surgical practices, a woman
could easily overlook it or perceive it as a formality. Thus,
one of the consequences of recent intensified interest in fetal
tissue research is an increased awareness of practices which
have existed for decades. The existence of this research, the
sources which researchers have used for procuring fetal
tissue, and the level of consent to the research use of fetal
tissue: all of these topics have now been brought into open
discussion, with the aim of clarifying ethical standards and
public policy objectives.

Fetal Tissue Transplants
While human fetal tissue has been used in research for
years, apparently without raising much concern, recent
attempts to use fetal tissue for transplants, particularly for
victims of Parkinson's disease, have been highly controversial.
The actual transplant of human fetal tissue into a diseased or
disabled human being seems to arouse public interest in a
way that laboratory study does not. The prospect of a cure
for a serious disease is exciting; on the other hand, the fact
that aborted fetuses provide the curative material may be
objectionable or even abhorrent. In addition, if these transplant
therapies become highly successful, one could anticipate the
need for large quantities of fetal tissue in the future, far
beyond what is currently used for a small number of research
projects.
Fetal tissue transplants for persons with Parkinson's disease began only in the 1980s, but other types of tissue
transplants have a much longer history. Even before the
discovery of insulin, the possibility of using fetal pancreatic
tissue to treat diabetes was suggested. The first actual
attempt at such a transplantation was made in 1928, shortly
after the discovery of insulin in 1921 (1). Between 1966 and
1988, there were at least 130 publications on human fetal
Journal of the Minnesota Academy of Science

pancreas and human fetal islet research. It is reported that
approximately 600 insulin-dependent diabetic patients have
received fetal pancreatic tissue transplants worldwide. The
literature, however, documents only 38 such transplants
were performed in U.S. institutions (3). Reports of transplants
made to an international registry are disappointing as they
indicate that there have been no long-term successfu'l human
fetal pancreatic grafts ( 4).
Transplantation of fetal liver or thymus tissue also has a
fairly long history (5). In 1959, a fetal liver transplant was
performed on a leukemic patient, with no benefit recorded.
In 1968, fetal thymus was used successfully to treat DiGeorge's
syndrome, and in 1973, fetal liver achieved the reconstitution
of the immune system of a patient with severe combined
immunodeficiency (SCID). Transplantations of between 200
and 300 patients with fetal liver were reported before 1987,
la~g~ly as. an alternative to bone marrow transplants. Most
chmcal tnals of fetal liver transplants have been conducted
outside the United States, and results are difficult to interpret
because of inadequacies in the reports or protocols. At
present, fetal thymus is the accepted treatment for DiGeorge's
syndrome, and fetal liver appears effective in treating SCID;
both of these conditions are rare. Other uses of fetal liver or
thymus tissue remain experimental at best (5).
The most dramatic use of fetal tissue has been the
transplantation of fetal neural tissue into persons with
Parkinson's disease. Before fetal tissue was tried, a number
of neural transplants had been done using the patient's own
adr~nal tissu~. Swedish researchers were the first to report
the1r results, m 1985 and 1987. However, they judged that
their four patients had received no significant clinical benefits (6,7). In contrast, Madrazo and his team in Mexico City
reported striking successes in two reports published in 1987
(8,9). Videotapes of patients, before and after treatment
were made available and even shown in the mass media. '
Encouraged by these successes, American researchers
treated series of patients at 15 centers, reporting more than
100 adrenal transplants by July 1988. After following these
patients for up to a year, researchers reported their overall
results to be disappointing. No trial reproduced the results
of the Mexican report 00). One commentator noted: "Irresistible forces have led to the application of an experimental
technique to humans with disease in advance of a firm basis
in neuroscience. This, of course, has happened before, but
rarely is it a sequence to be recommended (11)."
Even as its results from adrenal transplants were under
challenge, the team in Mexico proceeded to fetal neural
transplants, also in Parkinson's patients. In January 1988, two
patients received tissue from a single spontaneously aborted
fetus, and substantial improvement in their symptoms was
reported 02). This report was also challenged, largely
because of the stated gestational age of the fetus, 13 weeks,
which is too late for use of tissue of the substantia nigra, and
too early for identification of adrenal tissue 00). Fetal neural
transplants have also been reported from Sweden, where
initial attempts achieved a minimal improvement in symptoms, and in November 1988 at the University of Colorado,
where press accounts described improvement (10,13,14).
The first well-documented success was announced by
Swedish researchers in early February 1990; it involved the
alleviation of symptoms of Parkinson's disease in one patient
05).
Currently Yale University is conducting a study involving
20 Parkinson's patients, which is believed to be the first
controlled trial of fetal neural tissue transplants 00). Given
Volume 55, Number 3, 1990

the largely inconclusive evidence from previous attempts
the careful trial planned at Yale is welcome. Subjectiv~
assessments of improvements in persons with Parkinson's
disease can arise from wishful thinking, if protocols are not
carefully planned and monitored. Many suffering persons
and their families may have had their hopes raised without
adequate scientific basis. In late 1988, the American Academy of Neurology warned that initial results called for
caution, and proposed that further research be conducted
only in highly specialized centers (14). Studies like the one
at Yale may yield more reliable results and definitive
answers.

Current Law and Regulation
On the sensitive topic of fetal tissue research, the concerns
of ethics and the law intersect at many points. Legislative and
re~latory bodies have looked to ethical expertise for
gmdance, and their declarations in turn have stimulated
ethical reflection and discussion.
In order to avoid confusion, both in applying the law and
in making ethical arguments, it is essential to distinguish
dead from living fetuses. Discussions in the press and the
media often suggest that fetal tissue used in research and
transplantation is taken from living fetuses. While it is
conceivable t?at that could be done, it is highly unlikely at
the present tnne. Most abortions in the United States are
performed by either vacuum aspiration during the first
trimester, or by dilation and evacuation (D & E) in the second
trimester. Between 90 and 93 percent of all abortions
performed in the U.S. are done by vacuum aspiration, and
about 6 percent by D & E 06,17). Thus, almost all available
fetal tissue in the U.S. results from one of these two
procedures, and in neither case could a living fetus possibly
be presente~. _The two abortion procedures which might
produce a hvmg fetus are prostaglandin instillation and
hysterotomy; together these methods account for less than
one percent of all abortions in the United States.
Though researchers may require viable fetal tissue, or
tissue which is alive, the tissue is removed from a fetus which
is dead. Cells and tissue may continue to live up to several
hours after fetal death. If cells or tissue are procured shortly
after the death of the fetus, they may often be preserved for
a much longer time under appropriate laboratory conditions,
for example, cell culture or freezing.
Federal regulations enacted in 1975 severely limit research
i?~olving human fetuses; however, the restrictions apply to
hvm~ fetuses. The only statement made regarding the
remams of dead fetuses is the following:
Activities involving the dead fetus,macerated
fetal material, or cells, tissue, or organs excised
from a dead fetus shall be conducted only in
accordance with any applicable State or local
laws regarding such activities 08).
This statement is consistent with customary practices for
the disposition of fetal remains. Several states (Arizona
Illinois, Indiana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma) specifi~
cally prohibit research involving fetuses whose death was
caused by induced abortion. A similar Louisiana statute has
been held unconstitutional, however, with the court reasoning
that the state's interest in protecting fetal life "does not
continue past the death of the fetus 09)."
If fetal tissue is to be used for transplantation, then state
laws on the donation of tissue and organs for transplant
purposes would also apply to fetal tissue. The Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) was adopted by all states and
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the District of Columbia by 1972 . Its provisions specifically
allow donation of the remains of stillborn infants and dead
fetuses, if either parent consents and the other does not
object. The UAGA does allow the donor to designate a
recipient; this provision could be problematical with regard
to fetal tissue since it might act as an incentive for choosing
abortion (20).
The National Organ Transplant Act, passed in 1984 and
amended in 1988, established a national voluntary Organ
Procurement and Transplantation Network. In relation to
fetal tissue, its prohibition of the sale of body parts is most
significant. By specifically including fetal organs and tissue
among these body parts, it set up a national legal barrier
against their commercialization (20).

Federal Support of Fetal Tissue Transplant
Research
Since federal regulations on fetal research do not prohibit
the use of fetal tissue, there has been no legal obstacle to
federal funding of fetal tissue research. Over the years, the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) have conducted and
funded research involving fetal tissue. In early 1988, however, a group of NIH scientists proposed their first attempts
at implanting fetal neural tissue into patients with Parkinson's
disease. The director of NIH became concerned about the
implications of this research, and referred the matter to
Robert Windom, Assistant Secretary of Health. Windom
directed NIH to form a top-level panel of 21 members to
consider and formulate responses to a series of questions he
had prepared. These questions were mainly of an ethical
nature, but also raised issues regarding the scientific merits
and timeliness of such trials (21).
After three days of hearings and discussions, the NIHappointed panel prepared and issued its responses. The
issue it found most difficult to resolve was the relationship
between fetal tissue transplantation and elective abortion.
The ethical concerns arising from this relationship deeply
divided the panel. In its final report, the panel concluded that
safeguards could be established so that the two practices,
elective abortion and fetal tissue transplantation, could be
kept separate. Thus, it suggested that NIH could ethically
support research on fetal tissue transplantation. Though the
vote on crucial points was 18-3, the three dissenters provided
persuasive and forceful arguments for their dissent. In
addition, one person who voted with the majority dissented
from personally approving federal funding (22).
The report of the panel was forwarded to Health and
Human Services, where the new Assistant Secretary of
Health, James 0. Mason, was asked to make the decision. He
was strongly influenced by the dissenting statements, particularly their concern over the decision-making process of
a woman considering an abortion. He concluded that it was
likely that the therapeutic use of fetal tissue would influence
some undecided women to have abortions, and hence
increase the incidence of abortion. Therefore, he continued
a federal moratorium on support of fetal tissue transplantation
research (23).
It is interesting to note that the moratorium on federal
funding covers only transplantation research, and not other
forms of research which utilize fetal tissue. Perhaps it is
believed that only the immediate therapeutic use of tissue
would induce women to have abortions. Or perhaps the
distinction is a political one: since fetal tissue transplants
have received much more publicity than other long-standing
uses of this tissue, public sensitivities have been aroused and
4

expressed specifically in relation to transplant research.

Ethical Issues
Concurrent with the appointment of the NIH panel in
spring 1988, the University of Minnesota Center for Biomedical
Ethics undertook an extensive study of the ethics of fetal
tissue research and transplantation. Experts in a variety of
fields were asked to join its Research Group on the Use of
Human Fetal Tissue, and in a series of meetings they shared
information, listened to invited presentations, questioned,
discussed, and debated. The results of their deliberations
were announced in January 1990 in a report covering
scientific, ethical, and policy aspects of the topic (24).
As a member of this group, I acknowledge my indebtedness
to its members and consultants for much of the information
in this review article. However, nothing in the review should
be construed to represent the interpretations or opinions of
the Research Group. The primary focus of its project and its
report has been the identification and clarification of ethical
and policy issues; that is also the purpose of this review
article.
The ethical issues raised by fetal tissue research, specifically transplantation research, cover a broad range. Many of
these issues are similar to questions raised in other contexts:
Is this therapy still too unproven to test in humans? Are the
patients on whom it is tested adequately informed as to risks
and benefits? Is advantage taken of their desperate plight? If
available grafts are limited, who decides which patients
receive them? Who covers the costs? How are donated grafts
to be obtained? Who can consent to donate organs, cells, or
tissues, and how much information should potential donors
be given? Who monitors the trials conducted in various
centers so that reliable information is obtained? Behind these
questions is the assumption that research is conducted
ethically only when protocols safeguard personal autonomy,
insure that harm and suffering are minimized, and achieve
progress which is medically beneficial without treating
persons or groups unjustly.
Certain issues, however, are unique to research and/or
transplantation involving fetal tissue. These issues arise
because the source of fetal tissue is aborted fetuses. In fact,
most fetal tissue used for research or transplantation comes
from elective abortions. The current number of induced
abortions in the United States, about 1.6 million each year,
assures a large quantity of fetal tissue, available at predictable times and generally of good quality. Neither spontaneous abortions, nor ectopic pregnancies, nor other medically
problematic situations, could provide a significant quantity
of tissue which is healthy, viable, and available at the time
when it is needed (25).

The Use of Fetal Tissue and Abortion
Many people find the close connection between fetal
tissue research and abortion immensely troubling. These
people recognize that abortion is legal and widely practiced.
However, they do not accept the morality of elective
abortion, or at least of some elective abortions. They hesitate
to condone any practices which might seem to encourage or
cooperate with abortions that they view as immoral. • The use
of fetal tissue for research or therapy appears to them to
support immoral abortion.
As noted earlier, the three members who dissented from
the main conclusions of the NIH panel took this position and
strongly opposed any use of fetal tissue from elective
Journal of the Minnesota Academy of Science

abortions (26,27), while a fourth dissenter opposed federal
funding for fetal tissue research because of its connection
with abortion (28).
The majority of the panel, however, held that even if
elective abortion is immoral, one could morally use the
resulting tissue. Given the tremendous benefits which might
accrue from therapeutic use of fetal tissue, the panel
approved its utilization, with safeguards to keep the abortion
procedure separate from the process of procuring and using
the fetal tissue (29).
In the following sections, objections to fetal tissue use
based on its connection with abortion will be reviewed in
detail. The major objections fall into four categories: 1. In
practice, it is not possible to achieve the separation envisioned
by the panel; 2. Whatever degree of separation is achieved,
those who use fetal tissue are still involved in complicity with
immoral abortions; 3. The prospect that fetal tissue could be
used for a good purpose might lead some undecided
pregnant women to choose abortion; 4. The widespread
therapeutic use of fetal tissue might lead society to be more
approving of elective abortion, hence making it politically
more difficult to achieve restrictions on abortion in the
future. Each of these points will be discussed separately.

The difficulty ofseparating fetal tissue research from
abortion.
Various proposals have been made for separating the use
of fetal tissue from the practice of abortion. These include:
- discussing the possibility of fetal tissue donation only after
the consent to abortion has been signed;
- discussing fetal tissue donation only after the abortion has
been completed;
- prohibiting payment or other compensation for fetal
tissue, apart from the actual expenses of retrieval, preparation, and storage;
- prohibiting procurement agencies or researchers from
working closely with those who perform abortions, for
example, within abortion clinics.
Those who hold that, in practice, it is impossible to
achieve a clear separation between tissue use and abortion,
believe that implementation of the foregoing proposals
cannot be assured. Abortion clinic personnel are charged
with providing information and obtaining consent from the
pregnant woman both for the abortion procedure and for
tissue donation. This counseling is done privately, and no
one could monitor at what time, or in what manner, fetal
tissue donation was discussed. The most one could check
would be the time at which a consent form was signed.
Furthermore, as the public becomes knowledgeable about
the potential uses of fetal tissue, most women will be
acquainted with this possibility before coming to an abortion
clinic.
Effective regulation of the procurement of tissue is still far
in the future. Many researchers are reluctant to discuss their
sources for fetal tissue. They may receive it from private

contacts, primarily obstetricians, and generally free of charge.
Or they may order it from a laboratory or agency which acts
as an intermediary in procuring tissue. Since 1961 the Central
Laboratory for Human Embryology at the University of
Washington has provided fetal tissue free of charge to
researchers. In 1986 a non-profit agency was established
mainly to procure human fetal tissue, under the name of the
International Institute for the Advancement of Medicine.
HAM procures approximately 8,400 specimens per year for
researchers. It has a price list for various types of specimens
which it supplies, the fees intended to compensate the
agency for procurement and processing expenses. This
agency assigns its employees to work within abortion clinics
in order to process the fetal tissue immediately after abortion.
For this on-site access, HAM pays a clinic up to $1000 a
month, and also encourages clinic doctors to use a modified
abortion procedure which will increase the likelihood of
viable tissue ensuing (30,31).
The procurement of tissue thus ranges from purely
voluntary sharing by obstetricians to practices which appear
quite business-like and deeply entangled with the institutionalized practice of abortion. There is no mechanism for
regulation of tissue procurement at present, and thus, no
mechanism for insuring that fetal tissue procurement and
research are kept clearly separated from abortion. In fact,
without significant NIH involvement in fetal tissue research,
it is unlikely that regulation at the federal level will even be
discussed.

Fetal tissue research as complicity with abortion.
Even if safeguards can be implemented to separate fetal
tissue use from elective abortion, many people believe that
one would still be complicit with abortion simply by using
the resulting tissue. In this view, a user of tissue is supporting
elective abortion, or cooperating with it, and hence must
bear responsibility for immoral aspects of this practice.
The issue of complicity is probably the thorniest ethical
dilemma related to fetal tissue research. On the one hand,
given that the fetuses which provide the tissue are clearly
dead, to use their remains appears consistent with ethically
acceptable uses of the remains of dead children and adults.
Even when a death is the result of murder or suicide, the
donation and use of organs is considered legitimate.
In this vein, the Vatican Instruction onRespectforHuman
Life indicates that it is permissible to use tissue from fetuses
that have been electively aborted, under certain conditions:
The corpses of human embryos and fetuses,
whether they have been deliberately aborted or
not, must be respected just as the remains of
other human beings. In particular, they cannot be
subjected to mutilation or to autopsies if their
death has not yet been verified and without the
consent of the parents or of the mother. Furthermore, the moral requirements must be safeguarded that there be no complicity in deliberate
abortion and that the risk of scandal be avoided
(32).

• Throughout this article, the term "immoral abortions" is used
without any presupposition as to which abortions might be
included under that description. Surveys indicate that most people
regard some abortions as immoral, while a substantial number
consider most abortions immoral. Objections to the use of fetal
tissue relate to whatever abortions an individual regards as immoral,
either because of the reason for the abortion or because of the
gestational age of the fetus.
Volume 55, Number 3, 1990

This statement seems clear and straightforward at first
glance. However, it provides no interpretation or elucidation
of the "complicity" and "scandal" which it says must be
avoided.
This vagueness permits the Vatican statement to be used
as support by persons who oppose fetal tissue use as well
as by those who accept it. Opponents claim that the reality
of abortion practice in the United States makes it impossible
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to avoid complicity if one uses fetal tissue procured from
elective abortions. While the representative of the National
Conference of Catholic Bishops who testified to the NIH
panel said that "in principle" it would not be wrong to use
fetal remains, he clearly indicated that in practice, under
currently existing conditions, it would be wrong (33).
Elective abortion is an institutionalized and legal practice
in this country. Many persons make their living largely from
their involvement with this practice. Thus, abortion is quite
different from murder or suicide, isolated events which
society goes to great lengths to prevent. No one interprets the
use of a murder or suicide victim's organs as condoning or
encouraging further murders or suicides.
The use of fetal tissue, the remains of a fetus aborted
':ithin a systematic practice, could have different implications. A person who procures or uses this tissue could easily
be assumed to approve of the practice of abortion which
regularly provides the fetal tissue. Does a fetal tissue
researcher have any responsibility for clarifying his or her
position on abortion? Is it necessary to make a clear
statement of disapproval of whatever immoral abortions
provided the tissue? Or is the researcher required to abstain
entirely from using fetal tissue if that usage is apt to be
misinterpreted as approving abortion?
Even if a researcher or transplant recipient publicly states
his or her disapproval of the practice of abortion, these
persons are clearly benefitting from the existence of the
practice. Is it hypocritical to view a practice as immoral, and
yet to welcome the benefits which are possible only because
of this practice? In the case of an isolated event, say a death
resulting from drunken driving or child abuse, one can surely
benefit from donated organs while deploring the actions
which made them available. But in case of a series of events
which are part of an institutionalized practice, to condemn
this practice while regularly benefitting from it may strike the
observer as insincere, a type of "bad faith."
Some writers have drawn a distinction based on the
relationship between the supply of fetal tissue and the
demand for it (34,35). They believe that at the present time,
since the amount of available fetal tissue far exceeds the
research and transplantation demand for it, the user of fetal
tissue need not be construed to have any responsibility for
approving or encouraging abortion. These abortions would
take place anyway, and the researcher or transplant recipient
is merely taking advantage of a series of tragic events.
However, if the need for fetal tissue were to outstrip the
supply, so that research or transplantation depended on an
expansion of the practice of abortion, then researchers and
those involved in transplants could become partially responsible for extensions of the practice of elective abortion,
according to these writers.
If advances were made in growing cell lines from fetal
tissue, then a growing demand for fetal cells could be
supplied through these cell lines. Only a small number of
aborted fetuses would be needed to provide the initial fetal
material, and propagation would take place in the laboratory. While the cell lines would retain some connection with
the original abortions, the connection would be quite
remote. Also, an increased need for tissue would not have
the effect of stimulating the practice of abortion, since few
abortions would be needed to provide the initial fetal
material.
The issue of complicity demands the best thinking of all
who are concerned with fetal tissue research: scientists,
transplant surgeons, theologians, ethicists, legal scholars,
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consultants on public policy. Whether one believes that
most, or few, elective abortions are immoral, the existence
of a practice which includes and accepts immoral abortions
raises the complicity issue for essentially everyone. The
moral significance of a direct connection between fetal tissue
use and the practice of elective abortion is a concern which
has yet to be adequately addressed.
Fetal tissue use as an incentive to abortion

A less abstract concern regarding the use of fetal tissue is
whether the potential therapeutic benefit acts as an incentive
to pregnant women to choose abortion. Many pregnant
women go through a period of indecision when considering
abortion. If they are aware that the fetal remains could be
used for a good purpose, it is possible that this could "tip the
scales" in terms of their decision to abort.
Dissenting members of the NIH panel found these considerations persuasive and emphasized them in their position
papers (26,27). More importantly, despite all other arguments
provided pro and con, James Mason of Health and Human
Services based his final prohibition of NIH funding on this
argument alone. He stated that "the additional rationalization
of directly advancing the cause of human therapeutics
cannot help but tilt some already vulnerable women toward
a decision to have an abortion (28)."
The question of women's reasons for choosing abortion is
an empirical issue, and as one would expect, has been
studied and reported in the literature. Although many
reasons have been identified, there is nothing which would
lead one to conclude that the possibility of therapeutic use
of fetal tissue would be significant in influencing women's
abortion decisions. Up to this time, no studies have specifically
asked about fetal tissue use as a possible reason for choosing
abortion, so data are inconclusive either way.
However, one might attempt to extrapolate from available
data. A recent survey of 1900 women who chose to terminate
pregnancy reported an average of four reasons each for that
choice. The most commonly cited reasons were: a baby
would interfere with work, school, or other responsibilities
(75%); cannot afford a child (66%); have no desire to be a
single parent (50%)(36). Data over the years reinforce the
perception that a woman's decision to have an abortion is
almost entirely related to her own situation, the effect the
pregnancy will have on her life, and whether she is able or
willing to be a parent at the time (35,36,37). Among the 1900
women surveyed, more than one-fifth did indicate that their
choice of abortion was partly due to the wishes of their
husband, partner, or parents; but only one percent cited it as
their most important reason (36).
These data suggest that the possibility of generalized
altruism would not be a significant factor for a woman faced
with an abortion decision. Pregnant women considering
abortion appear to be almost totally absorbed in weighing
the effect which motherhood would have on their lives.
Their consideration of the wishes of others relates to specific
identifiable persons who play a major role in their lives.
Reasons aimed at a more general good for humankind, for
example, "the world is overpopulated," are not cited as
having a major influence in abortion decisions, and probably
have no importance for those women who are undecided
and struggling with the decision.
Extrapolation from available empirical information thus
tends to support the conclusion that fetal tissue donation
would not encourage individual women to have abortions.
Journal of the Minnesota Academy of Science

To focus on this possibility is seen by many as demeaning
to women, as it suggests that women are highly suggestible
and easily influenced by appeals to their kindly and caring
natures. Others take the concern more seriously and propose
that safeguards be established to prevent even the possibility
of such influence.
Safeguards mentioned earlier include separating consent
to tissue donation from consent to abortion, or requesting
consent after completion of abortion. There is almost universal agreement among ethicists that a woman should not
be permitted to designate the recipient of fetal tissue (38,39).
This provision would preclude a pregnant woman's interest
in helping a specific individual with whom she has a
relationship. Other proposals to minimize a woman's motivation to include tissue donation among her reasons for
aborting have been made: for example, to use only 50
percent of all donated tissue and to inform women of that
fact; or to list a large number of possible dispositions of fetal
tissue and not provide assurance of any particular usage
(other than prohibiting uses to which the woman objects).

The effect offetal tissue use on public approval ofabortion.
Since 1976, the number of abortions performed yearly has
remained relatively stable, as have abortion rates (abortions
per 100 live births)(40). Similarly, public opinion polls report
that public acceptance of abortion has also remained steady
since about 1973; approximately 50 percent of all Americans
approve of the present legal status of abortion (41). A poll
conducted nationwide by the New York Times and CBS
News on January 12-15, 1989, asked: "Should abortion be
legal as it is now, or legal only in such cases as rape, incest,
or to save the life of the mother, or should it not be permitted
at all?" While 46 percent of those polled said it should be
completely legal, 41 percent said it should be legal only in
situations like those enumerated, and 9 percent said it should
not be permitted at all ( 42).
Given the margin of error in such polls, it appears that
about half the population supports the present legal status
of elective abortion, while about half disagrees with it.
Because this division of opinion has remained consistent
since the legalization of abortion, and because the abortion
rate has stayed about the same for almost that long, the
situation appears unusually stable. Events which have taken
place over the years since 1973 do not seem to have affected
either public opinion or the abortion rate. In certain specific
areas, for example teen-age pregnancy, parental notification
laws and other restrictions also appear to have had no effect
either way on the overall rate of teen-age abortions. Minnesota
is particularly cited as an example in this regard ( 43).
Given the stability of public opinion regarding abortion,
what predictions can be made about the effect that fetal
tissue transplantation would have on it? If these transplants
proved to be therapeutically successful, it is possible that
persons opposed to most abortions might look more favorably
on them. However, predicting such changes in moral
outlook is extremely difficult, if not impossible. Basing
public policy decisions about fetal tissue use on their
possible impact on public opinion regarding abortion would
be making decisions on a purely hypothetical basis.

The Need for Regulation
This review has concentrated on ethical aspects of the use
of fetal tissue which are specific to this topic, namely, issues
related to the source of fetal tissue, elective abortion.
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However, this focus does not diminish the seriousness of
other ethical concerns. One of the most crucial concerns
relates to the government's decision not to support fetal
tissue transplantation research at the federal level.
An opponent of the use of fetal tissue for research or
transplantation will surely oppose federal support for such
projects. However, as noted earlier, NIH continues to fund
fetal tissue research which does not involve transplantation.
Moreover, attempts at fetal tissue transplantation will continue under other sponsorship, both worldwide and within
the United States.
It is reasonable to ask whether it is better for the federal
government to take a "hands off' approach to transplantation research as it has, or whether it ought to maintain an
involvement that enables it to set standards and act in a
regulatory capacity. In the U.S., the majority of research
funding in the areas of medicine and health comes from the
federal government. Standards and regulations imposed by
federal funding agencies have an impact far beyond the
funded projects which are strictly bound by them. Privately
funded researchers, non-federal institutions, whether private
or state, even scientific journals, tend to accept standards and
regulations of federal agencies to guide their own practice.
Thus, in withdrawing from the area of fetal tissue transplantation, the federal government has also abrogated its
role as guide and regulator (31).
Commentators have noted that there are two aspects of
fetal tissue transplantation research that show a particular
need for some controls at this time. The first is the lack of
established standards for scientific protocols and projects. As
shown earlier in this review, the success of fetal tissue
transplantation is questionable in many respects. Reported
"cures" or "significant improvements" often have not been
verified or replicated. Other series of trials have gone into the
high hundreds (for example, with fetal pancreatic transplants), without any long-term successful outcomes. Established standards for research centers and projects would
minimize the use of fetal tissue for attempts at transplantation
which will not yield scientifically valid results, and would
support the recommendations for careful screening of research
centers that have been made by professional associations
such as the American Academy of Neurology (14).
The second concern involves the procurement of fetal
tissue. While solid organ procurement is carefully regulated
in the U.S., tissue procurement is not, despite the fact that
some fetal tissue research not involving transplantation
continues to be federally funded. The varied sources from
which researchers obtain fetal tissue, the vastly differing
procedures and standards utilized by different procurement
laboratories or agencies, plus the secrecy under which much
of this activity is conducted; all contribute to a situation
where ethical abuses cannot even be detected, much less
corrected. Without federal involvement, effective regulation
is not likely to occur in the area of fetal tissue procurement
(30,31,44).
Thus, the cessation of NIH support of research in fetal
tissue transplantation will have a mixed effect. In some ways,
it may curtail this research and the related procurement of
tissue. But for those researchers and medical practitioners
who have other resources and avenues of access, the work
will probably continue. If there are few agencies involved in
procuring tissue for these research projects, those that
continue to function will have even more freedom to set their
own policies without checks or challenges. Widely varying
scientific and ethical standards will continue to operate. If
7

withdrawal of federal funding means essentially the end of
the public debate on policy, that could be cause for great
concern.

Research Group Report
The full report of the Research Group on the Use of
Human Fetal Tissue is available for $18.00 per copy through
the Center for Biomedical Ethics, UHMC Box 33, Harvard St.
at East River Road, Minneapolis, MN 55455, Attn: Mara.
Checks should be payable to the Biomedical Ethics Center
Fund. Tbe Use ofHuman Fetal Tissue: Scientific, Ethical and
Policy Concerns discusses advantages and alternatives to
fetal tissue transplants, reviews current policies governing
fetal tissue use, presents possible ethical frameworks for
evaluation of fetal tissue use, and reviews the ethical
arguments regarding elective abortion and fetal tissue use.
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